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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CRISIS INTERVENTION AND NATIONAL STABILIZATION: SETTING THE PRECURSORS FOR DEMOCRACY

BY

COMMANDER CHRISTOPHER D. NOBLE United States Navy

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Crisis Intervention and National Stabilization:

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Crisis intervention and follow-on national stabilization are challenging military contingency operations that receive few planning, programming, and budgeting resources. The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review all affirm that the military will be assigned to provide stability to Troubled States as part of our full spectrum of operations. These missions are frequently open ended, and the military tools and skills used for higher spectrum military operations do not apply well. However, there are techniques and cultural behavioral models from applied anthropology that may allow the performance of the stabilization mission with fewer combat resources.

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CRISIS INTERVENTION AND NATIONAL STABLIZATION: SETTING THE PRECURSORS FOR DEMOCRACY

"There are two things that will always be very difficult for a democratic nation: to start a war and to end it."

These two fundamental characteristics of democracies are as true now as they were in 1840 when stated by the French social philosopher Alexis Tocqueville in his <u>Democracy in America</u>. More than any other forms of government, democracies offer their peoples national ownership and self-determination. Democratic governments thus serve their people. When service to the people is the prime governmental focus, costly wars are quite naturally difficult to start. Democracies first try to influence other nations and states economically and diplomatically, before they resort to war. The first Tocqueville democratic characteristic, difficulty in starting wars, thus makes democracies good state neighbors.

To compensate for the second Tocqueville democratic characteristic, difficulty in ending wars, we in the military have recently developed very specific mission objectives, endstates, and exit criteria for the termination of military operations. When applied, these concepts have made the US military exceptionally successful when facing peer competitors,

such as during the cold war, and when dealing with regional contingencies like the Gulf War.

"The fact that none of my seniors have told me what they expect me to accomplish has not stopped them from asking me when I will be done."

This anonymous lament of the military commander in peacekeeping operations summarizes the paradox of employing combat troops in a national stabilization role. The specific military tools that have served so well for the high end are almost impossible to apply to the low end of the spectrum of military operations, that of dealing with troubled states and providing national stability. The mission, provide stability, has an end-state but few traditional military tools apply to achieve it. The national stabilization paradox has resulted in the US being unable to disengage completely from any of our peacekeeping commitments since World War II.

There are blocks of data and scientific disciplines that have tools that may apply to the military stabilization mission. These concepts have been successfully used by military commanders in World War II, and by other groups since then. Using prepared and focused techniques for the stabilization mission may save the more costly indefinite deployment of combat troops and prevent the unavoidable degradation of combat skills that occurs when military forces are assigned the stabilization mission.

In his commentary on the characteristics of democracies, Tocqueville includes a somber warning. "All those who seek to destroy the freedom of the democratic nations must know that war is the surest and shortest means to accomplish this. That is the very first axiom of their science."

To guard against this fundamental vulnerability of democracies, it is absolutely necessary that the military never loose the focus of our highest priority mission, To fight and win our nations wars.

THE INFORMATION AGE AND CRISIS ACTION

The world is again changing. Information technology coupled with reliable global transportation is effectively shrinking the planet. The National Defense University 1996 Strategic Assessment States:

"Faster and faster information flows reinforce the political trends towards increasingly open societies. Ideas, people, and goods are moving across borders at an unprecedented rate"

One of the benefits of the information age is that we can sense foreign national crises earlier than ever before. This early visibility into crisis gives us more options for national action. In theory, if a crisis intervention happens early enough, fewer resources will be required to correct it.

With the added timing options for national action in foreign crisis, there are also different methods that we can use to achieve national interests. Not only is information technology giving us global awareness, but it is also changing our preferred methods for applying national power. The 1996

Strategic Assessment notes this trend as follows:

"Mastery of information technology is surpassing mastery of heavy industry as the primary source of national power, whether exercised through commercial or military channels."

The actions and capabilities of other nations are more visible to us, and our actions and capabilities are more visible to them. In most cases, this is a positive result. The National Defense University Strategic Assessment summarizes this as follows:

"The ubiquity of global communications is creating new avenues for interests, culture, and values of the United States to percolate overseas (and vice versa)" 5

The global-awareness phenomenon of the information age also means that if a nation chooses to counter our interests and probe our weaknesses they can be better prepared to do so. More than ever before the type of conflict for which we are at greatest risk, is the one that we appear least prepared for.

As an element of national power, the American way of war is also changing. With the industrial age maturing into the information age, we are experiencing a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This is well summarized by the then Secretary of Defense:

"We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs ... are changing the face of war and how we prepare for war."

--William Perry, Secretary of Defense

The significance of Information Warfare and the current Revolution in Military Affairs we now face is well stated in the

1996 RAND corporation study <u>Strategic Information warfare: A New</u>
Face of War. I quote from the Summary:

"The source of both the interest and the imprecision in this field is the so-called information revolution--led the ongoing rapid evolution of cyberspace, microcomputers, and associated information technologies. The U.S. defense establishment, like U.S. society as a whole, is moving rapidly to take advantage of the new opportunities presented by these changes. At the same time, current and potential U.S. adversaries (and allies) are also looking to exploit the evolving information infrastructure global and technologies for military purposes."7

Most of the current research and development for the Revolution in Military Affairs focuses on how future technology will enable current military-strength techniques. Equally important to the technological aspects of the information age are global cultural exchanges. In particular, if acting earlier in crisis intervention gives us the follow-on mission of setting democratic precursors, we should constitute elements of national power specifically to perform this mission. The cultural aspects of the information age may have second and third order effects that are equally as important as the technological.

The United States is now a very different place, due to information technology, than it was in the industrial age. The island nation concept, so long a United States mainstay, is dissolving. In fact, the U.S. now has a strong dependence on foreign trade to maintain our current quality of life.

The United States has evolved into a consumer nation. With 266 million of the world's 5.772 billion people, we have 4.6

percent of the global human resources⁸. However, We consume 26 percent of the total global energy production⁹. Although not dependent on foreign energy, buying other nations resources' can be cheaper than producing our own, so we import 52 percent of our petroleum needs¹⁰. To maintain the US's high technology industries and manufacturing we import most of the required raw materials. We import more than we produce of 68 percent of the important industrial metals and minerals¹¹. Since much of what we consume does not originate in the United States, we have a clear and basic interest in maintaining open access to foreign production.

As a global consumer nation, we are tied more than ever to global production. The revolution in military affairs coupled with the information age gives us greater insight into foreign national crises, more options for timing, and methods for national action. There are now new opportunities for the application of national power. Do we have the ways to take advantage of them?

NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN CRISIS INTERVENTION

A core competency of successful nations involves delivering a quality of life at least as good as its citizens currently enjoy, to their future generations. If foreign crisis intervention and nation stabilization are in our national interest, it should be because our lives or at least our children's lives gain by it.

The concept of national interest is difficult to quantify. A model presented by Donald Nuechterlein describes four basic national interests of the Nation-State. 12 They are homeland defense, economic well being, favorable (stable) world order, and promotion of values. He further modifies the basic interests with levels of intensity. The four levels of intensity for each of the basic national interests are survival issues, vital issues, major issues, and peripheral issues. 13

In addition to the obvious survival defense-of-the-homeland, there are three more categories of national crisis in which the United States has interests of varying intensities. They are those that effect economic well-being, favorable world order, and promotion of values. Each of these has different considerations, skills, and techniques required for crisis resolution.

Economic well being issues

Economic well being is the easiest of the basic national interests to evaluate. The cost of foreign crisis resolution compared to its economic value provides a business-decision costbenefit prioritization for national action.

The conditions for free trade must be stable, or at the very least predictable, for investors to make a profit. For production to be profitable, the geopolitical climate must be conducive to international trade and relative risk must not outweigh the expected return. In order for the United States to continue to receive access to inexpensive, good quality foreign merchandise,

the governments of the producing countries must favor such trade and support the production efforts by their people. For these economic reasons, if stability is threatened, the United States has a stake in crisis intervention and the follow-on national stabilization in commercially significant areas of the world.

Promotion of Values issues

Promotion of Values as a national interest does not easily apply to the business-decision cost-benefit justification for national action. The failed nation-states of the Caribbean and the African Continent do not command the same intensity of interest as those of the mineral rich Persian Gulf. However, we as a nation still find ourselves committed there. Peace Operations in Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia are just such examples.

Mass human suffering and genocide, although sometimes not having a direct economic impact, frequently have second and third order effects that do change commercially significant areas.

Refugee camps and illegal immigrations of conflict-displaced persons can strain stable nation states.

The realm of distant human suffering, so often ignored until brought into our homes by CNN, pulls at the collective conscience of the American people. The right and moral action is to help these less fortunate peoples reach at least a basic level of existence. The question then becomes can we afford to stabilize that part of the global neighborhood where the only visible return is the right to occupy the moral high ground?

Favorable world order issues

The final category of national interest is favorable world order. The current concern over human effects on the global environment has been disseminated widely owing to the technologies of the information age. Although this category of interest is intended by Nuechterlein to describe environments for nonviolent conflict resolution, The destruction of non-renewable world resources may warrant intervention by the international community, and fall best in this interest category.

The severe industrial pollution of major population centers by failing states of the former Soviet Union have a very real potential to make large portions of land unusable. The Chernobyl nuclear accident alone rendered hundreds of square miles of land uninhabitable. Additionally there are many other nuclear reactors in deteriorating material condition, which threaten still larger areas.

Large-scale deforestation of the Amazon and African rain

Forrest is reducing planetary ability to maintain the atmosphere.

Deforestation is also eliminating the habitat for the diverse

biological gene pool found only there. These areas, though they

are not of immediate economic value or traditionally morally

compelling, may have such a large impact on our future that they

too are an area of interest for extended national action.

Crisis intervention in functional states can be short term and manageable. Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance are

examples of crisis intervention with limited commitment. However, crisis intervention where the state itself has failed is much more challenging. To set the precursors for democracy requires a stabilization presence in addition to the crisis intervention. This national stabilization is the most open-ended and challenging form of foreign assistance.

There are three categories of failed national conditions which can effect the national interests of the American people. First, national failure can have a direct economic impact on our life-styles. Second, chronic human suffering is morally compelling. Finally, environmental destruction may have strongly negative future consequences for the globe.

Each category of national failure requires different skills, task structure, and funding. Each commands different levels of interest-intensity by the American people. Foreign crisis intervention and subsequent national stabilization can be to our advantage, but are frequently complex, long term, and difficult to keep funded.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: FULL SPECTRUM RESPONSE

The elements of national power are the "means" to the "ends" of national interests. Military strength is one of these elements. The other elements of national power are political, economic, informational, and psychological 14. In crises where the nation has failed, the only real element of national power

capable of restoring order and providing the precursors for democracy is military strength.

Successful nation building by the military is historically well documented. Particularly noteworthy is the case where the conqueror in a decisive war chooses to mold the vanquished with "benevolence and righteousness"15. Admittedly, it is easy to dictate behavior to a culture when you are "standing on their chest with your sword at their collective throat." It is also easier because the vanquished had a recent history of working and executing as a team (fighting a war), and hence there is something cultural to build on. The success of the post World War II reconstruction of Japan and Germany by MacArthur and Marshall are excellent recent examples of successful national stabilization. In both these cases the reconstruction was militarily planned, supervised by a garrison government, and followed by a gradual withdrawal of occupation forces. throughout history, the military has quite successfully rebuilt defeated nations.

One post-war national behavior that fails frequently is humbling-the-vanquished-foe. The failure of the German Weimar Republic following the Versailles Treaty of World War I is such an example.

The military reconstruction of defeated nations is well documented and a supported form of military action. However, Defeat in war is not a necessary precondition for successful

national reconstruction. Even in cultures where the entrance test to adulthood is hatred of another ethnic group, the conditions for democracy can be set.

H. Roy Williams, liaison to the International Rescue
Committee on the Council on Foreign Relations said "You can't
eliminate hatreds, but you can make them irrelevant." The
comments of Salih Booker, Senior Fellow for Africa of the Council
on Foreign Relations, are similar. He said, "Hatreds are fault
lines exploited by politicians. They are something manipulated
when resources are scarce and are symptoms of economic
insecurities." Both these two distinguished members of the
Council on Foreign Relations and their Colleague, Robert
DeVecchi, President Emeritus of the International Rescue
Committee, were of the same strong opinion. Nation building can
occur in areas of intense ethnic hatreds if sufficient
infrastructure is provided.¹⁷

Preventing large-scale environmental destruction is a national interest where the application of national power is complicated. To the Brazilian government, the deforestation of the Amazon Rain Forest is farmland development. The states of the former Soviet Union first have to feed their people before they worry about their environment tomorrow. Environmental crisis requires significant engagement and shaping before the beleaguered nations accept environmental stewardship.

National stabilization and democratic preconditions have been established by our military in times of post war reconstruction. Such stabilization probably can be accomplished in economically depressed resource-scarce areas if infrastructure is provided. Ethnic hatreds can be made irrelevant. Environmental offenders may act responsibly if provided with the necessary skills and proper motivation.

Foreign national stabilization is not historically an explicit military mission. However, our new National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense Review call for the military to be a full spectrum force capable of intervention, stabilization, and fighting and winning the nations wars.

President Clinton said our national security strategy:

"Is premised on the belief that both our domestic strength and our leadership abroad are essential to advancing our goal of a safer, more prosperous America. Building upon America's unmatched strengths the strategy's three core objectives are:

- 1. To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.
- 2. To bolster America's economic prosperity.
- 3. To promote democracy abroad.

To achieve these objectives, we will remain engaged abroad and work with partners, new and old, to promote peace and prosperity." 18

These concepts of national interest abroad include the missions of crisis intervention and nation stabilization with promoting democratic precursors as part of the National Security Strategy. What the National Security Strategy does not explicitly state is which element of national power is most effective in these new missions.

The National Military Strategy picks up in defining the element of national power responsible for these new missions where the national security strategy stops. At the core of the National Military Strategy is the Statement:

"To protect and promote US national interests, our national military objectives are to Promote Peace and Stability and when necessary, to defeat Adversaries that threaten the United States, our interests or our allies. US armed forces advance national security by applying military power to **Shape** the international environment and **Respond** to the full spectrum of crisis, while we **Prepare Now** for an uncertain future." 19

The current document with the greatest influence on defense planning guidance is the <u>Quadrennial Defense Review</u> (QDR). The QDR "started with a fresh unblinking look at the world both today and over the temporal horizon to identify the threats, risks, and the opportunities for U.S. national security."²⁰

The defensive strategy for responding to the full spectrum of crises outlined in Section 3 of the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review States the following:

"The U.S. military will, at times, be called upon to respond to crises in order to protect our interests, demonstrate our resolve, and reaffirm our role as a global leader. Therefore, U.S. forces must also be

able to execute the full spectrum of military operations, from deterring an adversary's aggression or coercion in crisis and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars."²¹

The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirm that the military has the full spectrum mission of crisis intervention, national stabilization, and fighting and winning our nation's wars.

National stabilization, in particular, is a new and challenging military mission.

New roles and missions require resources for execution. Due to the current unprogrammed nature of military contingency operations, they frequently lead to budget shortfalls at the end of the execution year. In years with significant contingency operations, the operational solvency of the military may hinge on supplemental congressional appropriations.

THE BUDGET

"Policy is what gets funded"

These words of Professor Don Snow, at the US Army War College in November of 1990, reflect the stark, fiscal reality of today's resources limited federal budgets. All too often funding new programs and missions requires curtailing or canceling others. To ensure that the programs and missions with the most relevance to national interests are funded, the Department of Defense prioritizes the requirements for the military.

The priorities for the military as an element of national power are divided into three categories. First priority is dealing with the theater peers. The second military priority is responding to regional conflicts. Finally, the military must also deal with troubled states and transnational problems.²²

It is the funding for the final category, troubled states and transnational problems, that is especially difficult. Since the end of the Cold War, we have been much more committed to this third category of military operations. In the years 1982 to 1985, we as a nation employed the military on an average of six major peace operations per year. The corresponding years one decade later, and after the Cold War, found us committed it to a yearly average of 20 major peace operations.²³

Crisis intervention and national stabilization are also referred to as peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. When these operations are also unplanned, they become by definition contingency operations.

Until fiscal year 1997, these so-called contingency operations were not programmed or budgeted for. Their performance required emergency congressional appropriations relief. The Department of Defense cost for contingency operations from 1994 to present is shown below in Table 1.

Table 1. Cost of Contingency Operations in \$ Billions

					•	
\$ Billions	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	Total
Budgeted	0.0	0.0	0.0	\$1.324	\$2.225	\$3.50
Supplemental	\$1.46 ²⁶	\$1.51 ²⁷	\$3.228	\$2.0 ²⁹	\$2.530	\$10.67
Total	\$1.46	\$1.51	\$3.20	\$3.30	\$4.70	\$14.17

Peace operations are multibillion dollar military commitments to the category of least priority to military strength as an element of national power. Funding peace operations as contingencies are such a challenge, that the Secretary of Defense William Cohen said, "The bottom line of the funding reality is that contingency operations can kill readiness." 31

A method to fund these operations up front must be found, as they are so costly they now threaten readiness. We currently fund unplanned operations by four strategies.

- 1. From within the effected units' unused budget authority.
- 2. From within appropriation by slowing or curtailing all other units' training.
- 3. Reprogramming from modernization and future investment accounts (Research, Development and Procurement).

4. Requesting new money from Congress to fund contingency operations with an emergency supplemental appropriation.

In 1996, the \$3.2 billion spent on contingency operations was 1.3 percent of the \$252 billion Defense budget³². This does not seem challenging until you consider it must come from the flexible operations and maintenance (O&M) budget of about 25 billion. Peace operations so funded would amount to a tax of over 10 percent on the OPTEMPO, maintenance, and force transportation accounts. There is thus insufficient money from within appropriations to pay for contingency operations and not hurt readiness.

Reprogramming from modernization and future investment accounts is not a viable source of funds for peace operations. In 1989, these accounts had a total of \$144.5 billion dollars. Today, they have been cut by 45 percent to \$78.5 billion. The end result of the cuts in modernization is that the current procurement accounts of \$42.3 billion in fiscal year 98 are well below the \$60 billion required to keep a modern force. Future material readiness is already degraded.

The last method of paying for peace operations is by emergency supplemental appropriations. This is new, year-end money to pay for higher than expected bills.

Congress has provided supplemental appropriations to fund past contingency operations at the year's end as shown in Table 1. This year's-end bailout practice has proved detrimental to

readiness. The services must not overspend the accounts. To fund pay-as-you-go peace operations, they thus must restrict training and OPTEMPO for all units, until funds for these accounts are replenished.

Congress may not have the option in the future to continue paying for contingency operations with emergency appropriations. This is due to trends in the federal budget as a whole. The total resources that the American people are willing to provide for military strength are declining. In 1985, the Department of Defense was 28 percent of the federal budget and 7 percent of the gross national product (GNP). In 1997, DOD was 15 percent of the federal budget and 3.2 percent of the GNP.³⁴

The federal budget is conceptually divided into two major areas, discretionary spending and non-discretionary spending.

Discretionary accounts are those subject to annual congressional appropriations. The major categories of the discretionary spending are defense, domestic, and international. All three elements of the discretionary budget combined account for approximately one-third of the federal budget. Table 2 shows the multiyear, gross federal budget trends and projects data for fiscal year 2002.

Table 2. Multiyear Federal Budget Composition in \$ Trillions35

Fiscal Year	Total \$	Mandatory	Defense	Other
FY 1990	\$1.25 T	60.1%	23.9%	16.0%
FY 1998	\$1.69 T	67.6%	15.4%	17.0%
FY 2002	\$1.88 T	69.8%	14.6%	15.6%

Non-discretionary, or mandatory spending accounts amount to about two-thirds of the total federal budget. These are automatic, multiyear appropriations that become law without yearly congressional authorization. The non-discretionary accounts fund entitlements and pay the interest on our national debt. Mandatory spending comes off the top of the available resources before Congress begins the appropriations and authorization process. When the interest on the \$5.4 trillion national debt³⁶ is combined with soaring entitlement costs, the discretionary budget, that which is left, continues to shrink.

The federal budget is under great pressure from multiyear entitlements and interest on the national debt. Congress simply does not have much new money to offer the new missions of crisis intervention and national stabilization. Unless we can find innovative methods, we will, as Secretary of Defense William Cohen says in the closing paragraphs of the introduction to the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review:

"If we are not willing to do business in new ways, we need to face up to the fact and be prepared to pay more for less impact. Or, we can decide to do less and be less as a nation." 37

Unless we want to be less effective across the spectrum of military priorities we must as a nation find more cost and readiness-effective ways to perform crisis intervention and the national stabilization missions.

The bottom line is few new monies are going to be available for contingency operations. Therefore, we must be innovative in the ways we accomplish them. The option of simply expanding the military crisis intervention forces to take on the stabilization mission may not be realistic.

THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

"I think it's only in a crisis that Americans see other people. It has to be an American crisis, of course. If two countries fight that do not supply the Americans with some precious commodity, then the education of the public does not take place. But when the dictator falls, when the oil is threatened, then you turn on the television and they tell you where the country is, what the language is, how to pronounce the names of the leaders, what the religion is all about, and maybe you can cut out recipes in the newspaper of Persian dishes." 38

This quote from the American author Don DeLillo captures the current process of mass American cultural education. The American introduction to foreign crisis and culture is not usually related to category or intensity of our national interest. Our introduction to foreign culture is frequently generated by news media that are rewarded for presenting impact. This impact stirs the will of the American people, and a call for someone to do something builds. If the crisis involves a failed nation-state,

then the call to employ the military to stop the dying and stabilize the crisis also builds.

The current method of going over to the crisis region and staying until the failed nation becomes enough-like-us-so-we-can-leave is very expensive and open-ended. In fact, for all the peacemaking and keeping operations since the end of the cold war, it is hard to find a single one where we have disengaged.

Our challenge is to understand and to act in diverse cultures, specifically in those different from that of the developed Western nations. It is not nations like ours that are failing; it is those most different. This is the rub. All the other elements of national power, economic, diplomatic, informational, and psychological, rapidly lose effectiveness the more different from our own the recipient culture is. This rapid reduction in the utility of the other elements of national power all too frequently results in military strength as the only viable element remaining for national action.

Culture consists of the norms and values that a group of people evolve or develop to designate and fulfill their wants and needs. Very different cultures can be equally successful. Ruth Benedict, was a cultural anthropologist and advisor to the military in World War II. In her book, Patterns of Culture³⁹, she observed three basic cultural trends or themes that are radically different in human groups, but are fully successful in multigeneration survival. The differences in the three cultures of the

Benedict model are so great that actions in one culture producing a desired behavioral response do not apply in the other two. In fact, these mono-culturally-correct actions produce completely unpredictable behavior when applied to the other cultures.

The branch of the behavioral sciences focused on intercultural relations, (ours to another culture where we are
bringing something, stability, water, condoms, etc.) is applied
anthropology. This relatively new branch of science has had both
great successes and significant failures. However, applied
anthropology has generated blocks of data and schools of thought
that we could apply to the national stabilization mission.

There are three basic steps that could be used to focus the techniques of applied anthropology on the national stabilization mission. First, we must understand our own culture with reference to the cultures of other peoples and nations. Second, study and build full behavioral models for the recipient cultures. Finally, we must develop a set of trigger actions that we as the donor culture can apply predictably to the recipient culture to induce stabilizing behavior.

The first step in the application of behavioral science techniques, understanding our own culture in a multi-cultural context, is the greatest challenge. Benedict makes this clear with the following:

"Wisdom consists in a greatly increased tolerance toward their (Cultural) divergencies. No man can thoroughly participate in any culture unless he has been brought up and has lived according to its forms, but he can grant to other cultures the same significance to their participants which he recognizes in his own. $^{\rm n40}$

To be multi-culturally functional, it is not required (and may not be possible) to give up the significant forms of our own culture. It is also not necessary to assimilate all aspects of other cultures. But, it is necessary to recognize the significance to other peoples of their cultural forms in the same manner we accept the significance of our own.

For example, the simple golden rule, "do unto others as you would have them do unto you", only truly applies if all participants are members of the same culture. The cross-cultural golden rule is indeed more complex: "Do unto others as they have a legitimate expectation to have done to them", avoids the vagaries and miscues of mono-cultural behavior-triggers applied in a cross-cultural environment.

Another challenge in our own culture is the way we frequently confuse genetic and economic issues as precursors to group behavior. Benedict criticizes this aspect of Western culture with the following:

"Racial differences and prestige prerogatives have so merged among Anglo-Saxon peoples that we fail to separate biological racial matters, from our most socially conditioned prejudices."41

This explains our tendency to confuse the effects of economic and cultural poverty with that of race.

The second step in using the methods of applied anthropology is building detailed models of other cultures. Multi-decade

studies, found in projects such as Yale University's Human Relations Area Files (HRAF)⁴², provide significant blocks of data for building and maintaining cultural models. Individual focused ethnological studies have aided military commanders in national reconstruction. Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword:

Patterns of Japanese Culture⁴³ is one such work sponsored by the defense department to help understand Japanese culture and rebuild Japan after World War II. Benedict champions cultural modeling with the following:

"A few cultures understood as coherent organizations of behavior are more enlightening than many touched upon only at their high spots."44

The final step in applying the techniques of the behavioral sciences is developing specific trigger actions and behavior inducement tools. All cultures can be changed. The only way they have survived over centuries is through adaptive change. Again after Benedict:

"Civilizations might change far more radically than any human authority has ever had the will or the imagination to change them, and still be completely workable."

Cultural flexibility and adaptability are fundamental to group behavior systems. It is up to us to develop the methods. It is conceptually far less expensive, than our current methods, to change a culture by applying appropriately prepared stabilizing traits from us as the donor culture to the failing recipient culture.

In the 1997 <u>Quadrennial Defense Review</u>, Defense Secretary

Cohen says we have an obligation across all three priorities for
the use of military power.

"We have determined that that U.S. forces must be capable of fighting and winning two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. However, while the Bottom-Up Review focused primarily on that difficult task, we have also carefully evaluated to other factors, including placing greater emphasis on the continuing need to maintain continuous overseas presence in order to shape the international environment and to be better able to respond to a variety of smaller-scale contingencies and asymmetric threats."

If our continuing overseas presence is applied in the manner that the recipient culture is most able to accept, results will be faster and less expensive.

The American people are going to deploy the military to places like Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia to treat the symptoms of chronic cultural decay when the situation becomes acutely desperate. We in the military and in the non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and private volunteer organizations (PVO's) communities know that what is really needed are not short-term general military interventions but focused national stabilization. The behavioral sciences could provide some tools that would specifically enable these missions. A small well-trained and culturally aware nation building team may save the very expensive redeployment of armed forces later.

CONCLUSIONS

The shrinking global environment and the information age give the American people earlier visibility into developing foreign

national crises. They thus task the military to act sooner in crisis development, and with nontraditional methods. In crises involving failed nations, in order to set the precursors for democracy, the military services are increasingly tasked with the open-ended national stabilization mission, if only because there is no other element of national power capable of doing it.

Contingency operations such as national stabilization are expanded missions for the military. While maintaining our traditional mission to fight and win the nation's wars, the American people expect the military to be a multidimensional full-spectrum force able to do more than just killing people and breaking things.

The magnitude of the current commitment to military operations other than war, may now be effecting readiness for higher priority uses of military strength. In the post Cold War era, we are committed to an average of twenty major peace operations per year. This compares to an average of six during the cold war.

With increasing pressure from mandatory federal spending, there is little new money in the discretionary budget for new military missions. The resources for new missions frequently must come from within the Department of Defense budget authority.

The Services should consider programming and budgeting up front for crisis intervention and national stabilization. Since

1992, we have spent \$14.17 billion on these missions. Far smaller accounts receive much more prior planning and programming.

National stabilization and the setting of the precursors for Democracy are the most challenging and open-ended of military operations other than war. Unless we as a nation have unlimited time and resources, we must stabilize other cultures in a manner they can assimilate. Simply forcing Western society's template on traditional cultural behavior may be too expensive in time and money.

The behavioral sciences and projects like the Human Relations

Area Files could give added advantage to stabilization methods

and skills.

We should study the constitution of a distinct national stabilization unit with specialized skills and resources.

Relieving some of the combat intervention troops with a specially focused national stabilization unit will allow us to rotate back combat forces and train them for the next conflict intervention.

Word Count 5945

ENDNOTES

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